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Abstract
Political discourse is the verbal interaction between political actors in a policy domain.
This article explains the formation of polarized advocacy or discourse coalitions in this
complex phenomenon by presenting a dynamic, stochastic, and discrete agent-based
model based on graph theory and local optimization. In a series of thought
experiments, actors compute their utility of contributing a specific statement to the
discourse by following ideological criteria, preferential attachment, agenda-setting
strategies, governmental coherence, or other mechanisms. The evolving macro-level
discourse is represented as a dynamic network and evaluated against arguments
from the literature on the policy process. A simple combination of four theoretical
mechanisms is already able to produce artificial policy debates with theoretically
plausible properties. Any sufficiently realistic configuration must entail innovative
and path-dependent elements as well as a blend of exogenous preferences and
endogenous opinion formation mechanisms.
Keywords: Political discourse; Policy debates; Discourse coalitions; Advocacy
coalitions; Polarization; Social balance
Background
Political discourse is a complex phenomenon. Despite its intriguing prevalence in every-
day politics, there have been only few attempts at developing explanations of how
discourse works, and even fewer attempts at modeling this apparently ill-defined phe-
nomenon in a formal way. Political discourse, as it shall be analyzed here, is the verbal
interaction between political actors in a policy domain. For example, in the debate on
nuclear energy policy, a number of state and non-state actors speak up in the media and
call for specific policy instruments or make specific claims on the basis of their causal
beliefs. This phenomenon is based on a complex set of properties:
First, political discourse is dynamic because political actors repeatedly participate
in a policy debate. Consecutive statements of actors rather than simultaneous moves
constitute the essence of a discourse.
Second, political discourse is relational. Neither are actors insulated when they make
their claims in a debate nor are their statements randomly distributed across actors in the
policy domain or over time [1,2]. There is rather an interaction in which actors frequently
refer to what others said before. For this reason, social network analysis [3,4] is an appro-
priate tool for the measurement of empirical discourses. Ward et al. [5] conclude in their
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review article that network analysis ‘offers a means of addressing one of the holy grails
of the social sciences: effectively analyzing the interdependence and flows of influence
among individuals, groups, and institutions’ [5].
Third, the motivation of actors to participate in the discourse is based on the uncer-
tainty of other actors. Political discourse involves both ‘power’ and ‘puzzling’ over optimal
policy design [6]. The primary reason for the existence of political discourse is (Knightian)
uncertainty over causal relationships (‘does policy x lead to outcome y?’) and future con-
straints (‘if we implement policy x to solve problem y, will this relationship hold true
in the future?’). On the other hand, this uncertainty is exploited by those who have
vested interests. By making certain kinds of claims in a discourse, organizations try to
‘convince’ the undecided to adopt their claims; hence, discourse is also goal-driven and
can be understood as an exercise of power [7].
Fourth, as discourse is based on a dynamic, non-random interaction between actors, it
tends to be path-dependent [8] because actors rarely come up with completely new ideas
in a discourse. If all statements were based on completely new thoughts, the incentive to
make a statement in the discourse in the first place would vanish because it would no
longer be possible to achieve any goals by participating in the discourse.
Fifth, discourse is fragmented or polarized. Public policy research has shown that policy
domains and hence discourses are composed of several competing coalitions of actors
[2,9-11]. These advocacy coalitions or discourse coalitions tend to reiterate cohesive sets
of policy beliefs or claims, but there is little belief overlap across coalitions. This reflects
the notion of social balance as found in other mathematical and computational models of
cultural segregation and polarization [12,13].
Sixth, however, the literature on advocacy coalitions does argue that learning takes
places within and across coalitions [9]. In other words, coalitions in a discourse are
fragmented or polarized but not completely insulated.
Seventh, political discourse is an out-of-equilibrium phenomenon. Given the assump-
tion that participation in a discourse is instrumental for achieving goals like policy
platforms or merely the reduction of uncertainty about the problem ahead, a discourse
keeps moving forward along the time axis as long as the goals of almost any participating
individual have not been fully met. As such an equilibrium rarely ever occurs in politics,
political discourse as an out-of-equilibrium state has a possibly infinite time horizon. If it
were in equilibrium, either actors would eiterate the same sets of ideas in a certain order
over and over again or the discourse would end because previous contradictions between
antagonists would have been resolved (as argued by deliberative democracy scholars and
strongly opposed by liberal democracy scholars; for a discussion, see [14]).
The question then becomes how individuals select the normative concepts they advo-
cate in the public such that the discussion remains ongoing and that the above require-
ments are met. The professed goal of the models presented below is therefore to ascertain
under what theoretical micro-level conditions a political discourse as a meso or macro
phenomenon remains out of equilibrium for a substantial amount of time and shows the
properties outlined above.
Methods
I will present a dynamic, stochastic, and discrete agent-based model which rests mainly
on graph theory and local optimizationa. As Epstein argues, agent-based models are an
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‘analytical-computational approach to non-equilibrium social systems’ [15]. For this rea-
son, they are likely to be the most powerful tool available for theorizing about opinion
dynamics, both in political and other social contexts. And indeed, agent-based models
have been relatively often used to study opinion formation [16-20] while their prevalence
is still comparatively low in political science in general [21,22].
Agent-based models follow a ‘generative paradigm’ [15] because they serve to model
agents’ individual behavior in a bottom-up fashion and then evaluate the resulting macro
structure against the benchmark of empirical observations or theoretical expectations
of this macro structure. For this reason, agent-based models have been called ‘thought
experiments’ in the literature [23].
This is precisely the research design employed here. Some simple behavioral rules are
designed about how agents decide which claims they want to contribute to the discourse.
Given each mechanism, how will the behavior of the agents affect the macro structure
of the policy-domain-wide political discourse? Moreover, how do these separately plausi-
ble assumptions have to be combined to yield artificial discourses which are compatible
with the theoretical properties of discourses outlined above? Social network analysis [5]
is employed as a measurement model of the resulting discourse.
The model presented hereafter is modular insofar as various kinds of structural or indi-
vidual effects can be easily plugged into it or omitted from it. This design principle allows
to start off with a baseline model of completely random behavior, then testing of effects of
any single behavioral mechanism, and later on combining these mechanisms by attaching
weights to each of them.
Definitions and basic setup
In each round of the discourse, an actor makes a statement by publicly choosing and
announcing a concept. Let A = {a1, . . . , ai, . . . , am} be the set of actors in the discourse,
with i being the index of the evaluating actor (ego) and i′ being the index of an arbitrary
alter. Every single actor is associated with a randomly assigned ideal point on a single
ideological dimension (e.g., leftist versus rightist ideology). While drawing the ideologi-
cal ideal points of actors from a continuous, bimodal random distribution would be more
compatible with conventional political science models, the model described here rather
fixes the ideal points of actors at the extreme points of the ideological dimension, that is,
P((a) = φ(a)) = 12 with  = {0; 1}, in order to yield a clean bipolar ideology effect.
This dichotomous ideology is exogenously given and fixed over time. In theoretical terms,
it corresponds to what Sabatier calls ‘deep core beliefs’ [9] - unalterable normative ideal
points which are the source of much of the ideological conflict that is observable in polit-
ical discourses. These ideology constants work like in spatial models of politics where the
ideal points of agents are exogenously givenb. Actors are also exactly one out of two types:
an interest group or a governmental actor, irrespective of their ideology score. The actor
type is captured by a dummy variable θ(ai) = {0; 1}, which equals 1 iff ai is a governmental
actor.
Furthermore, let C = {c1, . . . , cj, . . . , cn} be the set of concepts, or claims, in the dis-
course. A random ideological score φ(c) ∼ U(0, 1) is associated with each c, with one
extreme of this dimension representing leftist values and the other end representing right-
ist values. This ideological dimension is the same as for the actors, but the ideological
scores of the concepts are drawn from a continuous uniform distribution.
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Each actor shall have a publicly visible history of the o last statements ai has made in
the media. Let Hi = {hi,1, . . . , hi,t , . . . , hi,o} be the history of actor i with concepts at time
t. By default, the history has o = 5 rounds with o being the most recent round, o − 1 the
second-most recent round, etc. The current decision about which concept to choose is
being made at o + 1 and thus does not yet belong to the history.
In each round, exactly one actor makes a statement. The actor is chosen randomly with
a probability of κ that a governmental actor is chosen. By default, there are five leftist
governmental actors, five rightist governmental actors, 15 leftist interest groups, and 15
rightist interest groups, and κ = 0.6. These proportions roughly correspond to empiri-
cal discourses in various policy domains [1,2,10]. By default, C comprises eight different
normative concepts. This number is sufficiently large to yield meaningful results, but it is
low enough to ensure a reasonable computing time.
Actors make their concept choices based on a behavioral mechanism or based on a cus-
tom blend of eight possible mechanisms. In each round, actor i computes an aggregated
score for each concept, which is based on various criteria and then adopts the concept
with the highest score. The details of these criteria or mechanisms and the aggregation
via a utility function are described in the following paragraphs.
Exogenous ideology
Ego assigns a score to cj which corresponds to the similarity between his or her ideology
and the ideology of cj:
XIi
(
cj
)
:= 1 − ∣∣φ(ai) − φ (cj)∣∣ (1)
This mechanism represents the classic view that interest groups have a rather fixed set
of preferences and try to pull the outcome of policy-making into their ideological direc-
tions. Actors make normative statements in the discourse which are close to their own
ideal point [24]. It should be straightforward to assume that interest groups will rather
express statements that support their ideology than statements running against their own
ideology.
Endogenous ideology
Ideology does not have to be exogenously given. It can be conceptualized as being path-
dependent such that ego assesses whether a concept is ideologically compatible with the
concepts ego has named before. Ego computes the average (or total) similarity between
the concepts in his or her history and cj:
NIi
(
cj
)
:=
t=o∑
t=1
(
1 − ∣∣φ (hi,t)− φ (cj)∣∣) (2)
Concept popularity or preferential attachment to concepts
For a given actor i and a given concept j, letM be the set of alters i′ who have announced
concept j in the latest round, o.
Mi,j :=
{
i′ | i′ = i ∧ ai′ ∈ A ∧ hi′,t=o = cj
}
(3)
Ego assigns the number of alters in the set as the score:
CPi
(
cj
) = ∣∣Mi,j∣∣ (4)
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In other words, ego chooses a concept that is currently popular. This may be one of the
drivers of ‘political waves’ [25] or ‘issue attention cycles’ [26]; topics or claims within a
debate come and go in ‘waves’ because actors jump on the bandwagon once another actor
has started to use a concept in the discourse.
A politician or a party that just ignores claims brought up by others will not be re-
elected, and similarly a government department will be criticized if it ignores important
facts of the problem it is in charge of.
In the literature on social networks, the choice of already popular nodes is known as
‘preferential attachment’ and has been described as one of the building blocks of network
formation [27].
Actor similarity or coalition formation
The actor similarity score follows from the prediction of the Advocacy Coalition Frame-
work [9] and other interest group theories [28] that interest groups are organized in
coalitions. According to the former theory, actors learn more easily from other actors if
they are in the same coalition. A coalition, however, is not a formal arrangement. It is
rather constituted by the similarity of ‘belief systems’ between actors [9]. Consequently,
actors identify other actors who are in the same coalition by measuring their overall belief
similarity and then adopt their beliefs.
More precisely, for any given concept j, an actor first considers the histories of all other
actors (that is, their last five concepts) who recently chose j and computes their similarities
to his or her own history list by counting the co-occurrences of concepts. Actor i chooses
the concept which maximizes the fit between actor i and actors i′ who recently chose
j. This method directly implements the idea of adaptation from actors who have similar
belief systems and is thus a device of discursive coalition formation. Given Equation 3,
ego assigns the following score to concept j:
ASi
(
cj
) =
{
0 if Mi,j = ∅∑
i′∈M|Hi∩Hi′ ||Mi,j| if
∣∣Mi,j∣∣ ≥ 1, (5)
where |Hi ∩ Hi′ | is the size of the intersection of the histories of ai and ai′ and where
the whole numerator captures the total similarity of ai to all ai′ who announced cj in the
last round. The function therefore assigns a value to cj which is equivalent to the average
similarity of the history of ai to other actors’ histories who recently announced cj and thus
captures the degree to which cj was recently chosen by similar actors (i.e., actors from the
same coalition) and operationalizes coalition formation.
Concept similarity or following the wisdom of the crowds
Define Gj as the set of alters who contain concept cj in their history:
Gi,j :=
{
i′ | i′ = i ∧ ai′ ∈ A ∧ cj ∈ Hi′
}
(6)
Let s(cj, cj′) be the similarity between two concepts as measured by the number of actors
who have both concepts in their histories:
s(cj, cj′) =
∣∣Gi,j ∩ Gi,j′ ∣∣ (7)
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Ego sums up the similarities between all of his or her past concepts and concept j. The
result is the concept similarity score of cj:
CSi
(
cj
) = t=o∑
t=1
s
(
cj, hi,t
)
(8)
In other words, a co-occurrence matrix is created which contains the similarities
between all concepts. Two concepts are more similar, the more often an actor refers to
both of them in his or her history. For every concept in the discourse, the method then
adds up the similarities between this concept and each item in the history list of the cur-
rent actor. This results in the total similarity between a concept and the current actor,
based on both his or her history and the evaluations of all other actors.
One rationale for this method is the tendency of subjects to deny information that does
not conform to their own beliefs [29]. Concepts should be as compatible to one’s own
prior statements as possible, and other actors’ use of concepts may be an important data
source for evaluating how similar two concepts actually are.
At the same time, political actors strive for new arguments and concepts in support
of their claims ([30], pp. 290). Actors try to position themselves in the discourse, avoid
being isolated with their claims, and they closely observe which other concepts are both
popular and close to their own position. If they adopt such a claim, it is more likely that
other actors will refer to them and in turn adopt their other concepts.
Actor’s history or self-consistency
Ego assigns a positive score to concept j if ego named the concept in his or her history,
otherwise 0. The more recent the statement, the higher the score:
AHi
(
cj
) =
{
max
{
t | cj = hi,t
}
if cj ∈ Hi
0 if cj /∈ Hi (9)
This mechanism stems from social psychology. Individuals (and organizations as collec-
tive actors) try to maximize consistency with their previous statements. This results in an
actor’s own latest statement scoring highest, the one before second-highest, etc. Concepts
which are not in the actor’s history receive the minimum score.
This method is based on cognitive dissonance theory and its descendants [31,32]:
Aronson’s self-consistency theory implies that actors strive for consistent views of them-
selves in order to avoid dissonance [29]. Cialdini et al. define consistency as the ‘tendency
to base one’s responses to incoming stimuli on the implications of existing (prior entry)
variables, such as previous expectancies, commitments and choices’ [33]. Actors weight
their own previous statements higher than other concepts because they want to main-
tain and communicate a coherent image of themselves, leading to path dependence of an
actor’s statement choice.
Rare concepts or agenda setting
Particularly interest groups find it worthwhile to revive a sleeping discourse. If there is a
concept that has not been actively discussed for quite some time, it proves to be a good
opportunity to pick up this concept and re-introduce it into the discourse in order to pull
the debate into a certain direction. Actors may thus have a tendency to make claims which
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are not on many actors’ agenda in order to act as an agenda setter. Especially those rare
concepts are attractive which are close to the actor’s own ideal point. Therefore, it makes
sense to combine the mechanism of choosing rare concepts with the ideology mechanism
described above.
The agenda-setting score is the number of alters who have concept cj in their history
divided by the number of alters in the discourse, subtracted from 1.
RCi
(
cj
) = 1 −
∣∣Gi,j∣∣
m − 1 (10)
Based on Equation 6, this strategy resembles inverse concept popularity (but concerning
all rounds in the history, not just the latest round).
Government coherence
As an extension of Equation 6, let Bi,j be the set of alters who hold concept cj in their
history and who are governmental actors.
Bi,j :=
{
i′ | i′ = i ∧ ai′ ∈ A ∧ cj ∈ Hi′ ∧ θ(ai) = 1
}
(11)
Government coherence is the number of alters who are governmental actors and who
have cj in their history:
GCi
(
cj
) = ∣∣Bi,j∣∣ (12)
For every concept, the government coherence method counts by how many (other)
governmental actors the concept was previously chosen, i.e., in how many (other) gov-
ernmental actors’ history lists it is present. The method serves two different purposes for
interest groups and governmental actors.
For governmental actors, this in an important procedure because they usually share
common goals, despite potential ideological differences due to coalition governments. In
most political systems, the various government departments are tied together by common
objectives, parties, coalition contracts, or presidents. The aim of the method is to unify
governmental actors by aligning them with each other.
For interest groups, this method defines the degree to which they adhere to the col-
lective ideal point of the government. In consensual or corporatist political systems, the
importance of this mechanism for interest groups should be high, while it should be low
in majoritarian or pressure-pluralist systems [34].
Normalization
Each of these variables, or evaluation functions, yields a score that an actor assigns to a
concept. Their ranges (in the statistical sense) differ substantially. However, they should
be on the same scale in order to be comparable in a meaningful way. The following pro-
cedure thus converts the list of scores into a ranking list with 1 being the lowest rank and
n (the number of concepts) being the highest or best rank. Two items with the same fre-
quency (that is, ties) should be assigned the lower of the two rank positions. For example,
if there are three concepts with the same score, and there are two items with a lower and
three items with a higher score than the three items under consideration, the three items
should all be assigned rank 3.
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Let f (cj) be an evaluation function that assigns a score to concept j. Furthermore, let
D = ( f (c1) , . . . f (cj) , . . . , f (cn)) = (d1, . . . , dl, . . . , dn) (13)
be an n-tuple of assigned scores such that ∀l < n : dl ≤ dl+1. Then, let g : D  S be a
surjection with
g(dl) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if l = 1
l if l ≥ 2 ∧ dl > dl−1
g
(
dl−1
)
if l ≥ 2 ∧ dl = dl−1
(14)
Finally, (g ◦ f )(cj) is the normalized value of f (cj).
A fictitious example: Assume there are four concepts with different scores resulting
from the concept popularity evaluation function, CPi(c1) = 14, CPi(c2) = 3, CPi(c3) =
14, and CPi(c4) = 19. Then, D is the ordered set {3, 14, 14, 19}. The normalization func-
tion assigns the values {1, 2, 2, 4} because the first item matches the first rule of the
surjection, the second and fourth items the second rule, and the third item the third rule
of the g function.
Utility functions
Assuming that there are p = 8 evaluation functions, the utility of actor i for choosing
concept j is defined as
U igi (cj) = β1g
(
XIi(cj)
)+ β2g (NIi(cj))+ β3g (ASi(cj))+ β4g (CSi(cj))
+ β5g
(
AHi(cj)
)+ β6g (CPi(cj))+ β7g (RCi(cj))+ β8g (GCi(cj)) (15)
with β ∈ R being an arbitrary weight. As mentioned above, there are governmental actors
and interest groups. The utility function with the β weights introduced in Equation 15
is only applicable to interest groups. A second utility function for governmental actors
exists where the β weights are replaced by γ weights. In all other regards, the functions
are identical. This allows for a subclass of model specifications where there is in fact only
a single actor type, that is, in the case where ∀k : βk = γk . Governmental actors thus
maximize the following utility function:
Ugovi
(
cj
) = γ1g (XIi(cj))+ γ2g (NIi(cj))+ γ3g (ASi(cj))+ γ4g (CSi(cj))
+ γ5g
(
AHi(cj)
)+ γ6g (CPi(cj))+ γ7g (RCi(cj))+ γ8g (GCi(cj)) (16)
In either case, actors choose an optimal concept which maximizes their utility:
c∗ = argmax
cj∈C
Ui
(
cj
) = argmax
cj∈C
8∑
p=1
βp
((
g ◦ fp
) (
cj
))
(17)
If there are several optimal concepts, the actor chooses from a discrete uniform
distribution:
∣∣C∗∣∣ > 1 ⇒ P(C = c) = 1|C∗| (18)
This step ensures that there is always exactly one concept per actor and round.
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The discourse model is run for several thousand time steps. At each step, an actor is
selected according to the probability rule described above, and this actor makes a publicly
visible statement according to the outcome of the utility function, thereby updating his or
her history of concepts.
Measurement
As shown in the literature on ‘discourse networks’ [1,2,35,36], network analysis can be
employed to study empirical aspects of political discourse like the shape, stability, and
coherence of discourse or advocacy coalitions, cleavage lines in a policy domain, diver-
sity of arguments, and the degree of polarization of a discourse. A discourse can be
operationalized as follows. If A is the set of actors in a discourse and C denotes the
set of concepts in the discourse, then a bipartite graph Gaff = (A,C,Eaff) with edges
eaff(a, c) ∈ Eaff can be constructed. The aff superscript indicates that this is an affilia-
tion network, or a bipartite graph. The bipartite graph can be converted into a one-mode
projection, or ‘co-occurrence’ network, Ga = (A,Ea), where the superscript a denotes a
network composed only of actors. Formally, this can be achieved by considering neigh-
bors of actors in the bipartite graph. The set of neighbors is defined as the collection of
concepts which are incident to an actor, that is, NGaff(a) := C ∈ Eaff(a). Accordingly,
edge weights between actors in Ga are computed as w(a, a′) = |NGaff(a) ∩ NGaff(a′)|,
which amounts to the number of concepts two actors share. The resulting network pro-
vides a cross-sectional map of the discursive landscape of political actors. Ties between
actors show their discursive similarity; the absence of ties between actors or groups of
actors represents discursive dissimilarity. The full array of network-analytic methods can
be used to describe the discourse in a precise way, e.g., the degree of polarization between
groups of actors, the number of components or clusters as instances of discourse coali-
tions or advocacy coalitions, or the change of the discursive network structure over time
(and thus discursive equilibria).
This measurement model is used to analyze the simulation outcomes as follows. After
each new statement, the collective histories of all actors are visualized as an actor × actor
co-occurrence network over all concept histories of actors. Beyond visual inspection, five
particular statistics are used to analyze the resulting networks: a new measure of ideo-
logical polarization, betweenness centralization, the number of components as a share
of the initial number of concepts, the proportion of concepts still alive, and the concept
replacement rate in the histories of all agents. These measures are discussed below.
Each of the five indices is calculated after a single new step in the discourse. Every par-
ticular configuration of the utility functions (in terms of the β and γ weights) of interest is
simulated 100 times in order to guarantee that the results are reliable. Since there are 100
simulation runs, there is a random sample of 100 observations for each measure per time
step. The mean values of the 100 simulations are plotted as a time series, and this is done
for each of the five indices (see Figure 1). Dashed lines around the time series lines repre-
sent the 95% confidence interval. Ninety-five out of the 100 simulations lie within these
boundaries. The procedure is repeated for several different configurations of the utility
functions.
While the agent-based model was implemented in the programming language Java,
additional capabilities from the JGraphTc and RepastJd add-on libraries are used for the
analysis.
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Figure 1 Simple configurations. Results of 100 simulation runs. 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines.
Ideological polarization (red), share of concepts still alive (orange), share of recent concept changes (green),
betweenness centralization (blue), and number of components as a share of the initial number of concepts
(black). β = interest group and γ = governmental actor. β1 and γ1 = exogenous ideology (XI), β2 and
γ2 = endogenous ideology (NI), β3 and γ3 = actor similarity/coalition formation (AS), β4 and γ4 = concept
similarity/wisdom of the crowds (CS), β5 and γ5 = actor’s history/self-consistency (AH), β6 and γ6 = concept
popularity (CP), β7 and γ7 = rare concepts/agenda setting (RC), and β8 and γ8 = government coherence (GC).
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Betweenness centralization
The primary structural feature of interest is whether everybody aligns with everybody
else, or whether the network tends to be composed of factions or ‘coalitions’ [9,11]. Several
studies have shown that empirical discourses tend to be composed of distinct coalitions
with few bridging ties or nodes [1,2,35]. Betweenness centralization [37] captures this
aspect by measuring the tendency of a vertex to act as a bridge between many other
vertices. The notion of betweenness is operationalized by the number of shortest paths
(geodesics, gjk) the vertex is situated on (gjk(ni)), standardized by the number of dyads not
involving the vertex for which betweenness centrality is being calculated ([4], pp. 190):
C′B(ni) =
∑
j<k
gjk(ni)
gjk
(m−1)(m−2)
2
(19)
Centralization (in contrast to centrality) is a network-level index which sums up the dif-
ferences between the highest centrality value found in the network, denoted as C′B(n∗),
and the centrality values of all other nodes, C′B(ni), and divides this sum by the maximum
sum that is theoretically possible:
Betweenness centralization =
∑g
i=1
[
C′B(n∗) − C′B(ni)
]
max
∑g
i=1
[
C′B(n∗) − C′B(ni)
] (20)
Centralization thus captures the tendency of a network to have few (in the extreme
case: one) very central and many peripheral actors ([4], pp. 177). Applied to the problem
at hand, betweenness centralization measures the tendency of a network to have very few
vertices that interconnect distinct factions in the network. The drawbacks of this mea-
sure are that betweenness centralization is zero if the factions lose their interconnection
completely and that the factions do not necessarily correspond to ideological cliques.
Therefore, another measure of ideological polarization is introduced below.
Ideological polarization
Ideological polarization is a variant of assortative mixing by scalar properties [38]. It
measures the degree to which vertices with a similar ideology score are connected and
dissimilar actors are disconnected and thus to what extent the whole network is polarized
with regard to the nodal attribute ‘ideology’. Polarized networks exhibit two ideological
clusters.
To compute nodal attribute polarization, three equations are necessary. First, the sum
of absolute ideological differences between non-connected (separated) actors has to be
computed:
∀i : i = i′ ∧ Hi ∩ Hi′ = ∅ and ∀i′ : i′ = i ∧ Hi ∩ Hi′ = ∅ :
IDsep =
m∑
i=1
m∑
i′=1
|φi − φi′ |
(21)
Second, calculate the sum of absolute ideological differences between connected actors,
but this time, the difference has to be multiplied by the edge weight each time:
∀i : i = i′ ∧ Hi ∩ Hi′ = ∅ and ∀i′ : i′ = i ∧ Hi ∩ Hi′ = ∅ :
IDcon =
m∑
i=1
m∑
i′=1
(|φi − φi′ | · |Hi ∩ Hi′ |)
(22)
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Note that the vertical bars denote absolute values in the first case and cardinality of the
set in the second case. Finally, ideological polarization can be measured as
Polarization = IDsepIDsep + IDcon (23)
These equations define the polarization measure between 0 and 1. Values of 0.5 do not
show any association, values close to 1.0 a strong positive association, and values close to
0.0 a strong negative association.
In contrast to betweenness centralization, the polarization score remains high if two
distinct components are completely separated, and the measure captures only ideolog-
ical polarization, not any other polarization tendencies such as endogenous coalition
formation. On the other hand, betweenness centralization does not become obsolete
because it is still a useful measure in situations where polarization occurs along other
dimensions.
In comparison to assortative mixing by scalar properties [38], this ideological polariza-
tion measure is compatible with valued graphs as employed here, it is applicable in cases
where a maximum of two coalitions or communities is possible, it scales between 0 and 1
(rather than −1 and +1), and it has a simpler formulation.
Number of components
A component is a subgraph that is not connected to the remaining network. If the dis-
course gets so bi- or multipolar that two or more separate components exist, there is no
more common ground between different factions. This may occasionally happen in real-
world policy debates, but the situation should be reversible - usually after a couple of
rounds.
To obtain a standardized index between zero and one, the number of components is
divided by the initial number of concepts in the discourse because this corresponds to the
maximum number of components possible.
Proportion of concepts still alive
The fourth index measures the integrity of the discourse by counting how many concepts
are still alive (that is, mentioned by at least one actor in his or her latest round). In a
healthy and ongoing debate, at least two thirds of the initial ideas should still be present
after a substantial amount of time. This integrity measure is defined as follows:
Concepts still alive =
∣∣{cj | ∃ai ∈ A : cj = hi,t=o}∣∣
n (24)
Concept attrition is high if this integrity index is low.
Number of recent concept changes
The following replacement index captures the number of recent concept changes by
counting the number of actors whose latest concept differs from his or her concept in the
previous round, divided by the number of actors in total:
Recent concept changes =
∣∣{ai | hi,t=o = hi,t=o−1}∣∣
m (25)
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The replacement index thus measures in how far the discourse is in motion and can
serve as an early indicator of whether the discourse is in equilibrium or not. The goal
is to obtain a replacement level that is neither close to 0 nor close to 1 in order to
yield a steady-state but out-of-equilibrium discourse as described at the beginning of the
article.
Results and discussion
The first question that is going to be answered in this section is assuming that one of
the eight mechanisms elaborated above is exclusively at work in a discourse, then how
does this affect the overall properties of the discourse over time? After answering this
question for each of the eight mechanisms separately, interactions of several mechanisms
are evaluated in terms of their effects on discourse evolution.
As a first validity check, a null model without any mechanism in the utility functions is
run, that is, ∀k : βk = γk = 0. As expected, the result is an Erdo˝s-Rényi random graph.
Figures 1 and 2 show the results of 14 different configurations of the objective function.
The first eight configurations (Figure 1) test the single effects of each of the eight com-
ponents of the utility functions. In each diagram, there is an initial rewiring process, or
a phase transition, from an Erdo˝s-Rényi random graph to an equilibrium based on the
specific parameter settings [39].
Analysis of each of the eight mechanisms
If ideological fit is the only criterion actors maximize (Figure 1, first diagram), the dis-
cursive space ends up with two distinct components after about 1,000 time steps. They
correspond to two distinct ideological camps, which are internally perfectly connected.
As shown by the blue curve, betweenness centralization increases in the initial rounds
of the rewiring process until the discourse is so bipolar that the two camps become dis-
connected. When this happens, the black curve shows that the number of components
is increased from one to two (shown here is a fraction of the number of concepts). The
red curve reveals that ideological polarization is maximal, so the two components are
each composed of one ideology. The number of concept changes (the green curve) goes
down to zero, which means that the network does not change anymore after this stage.
As indicated by the orange curve, there are only two concepts left in the discourse (one
in each coalition), and all others become extinct. Purely ideology-driven actors are thus
fairly unrealistic.
What happens if one replaces exogenous ideology with an endogenous specification of
ideology, as plotted in the second diagram? If actors base their decision on the ideological
distance between their own history and a new concept under consideration, they always
opt for concepts they have named before, leading to path dependency of concept choice.
At the aggregate level, this leads to an equilibrium where each actor chooses one single
concept for the remaining time, and thus there are almost as many distinct components as
there are concepts in the discourse. One concept becomes extinct, all others remain alive.
Ideological polarization is fairly high, but the number of distinct camps is unrealistic if
compared to real-world discourses and theories of the policy process [9,11].
If all actors pursue a coalition-formation strategy by adopting concepts from other
actors with a similar concept profile (third diagram), the result is very similar. In this case,
all concepts remain alive, and there are as many components in the discourse after about
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Figure 2 Interaction effects. Results of 100 simulation runs. 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines.
Ideological polarization (red), share of concepts still alive (orange), share of recent concept changes (green),
betweenness centralization (blue), and number of components as a share of the initial number of concepts
(black). β = interest group and γ = governmental actor. β1 and γ1 = exogenous ideology (XI), β2 and
γ2 = endogenous ideology (NI), β3 and γ3 = actor similarity/coalition formation (AS), β4 and γ4 = concept
similarity/wisdom of the crowds (CS), β5 and γ5 = actor’s history/self-consistency (AH), β6 and γ6 = concept
popularity (CP), β7 and γ7 = rare concepts/agenda setting (RC), and β8 and γ8 = government coherence (GC).
1,000 time steps. The degree of ideological polarization is realistic, but the component
structure is not.
The pattern is very different if actors choose their concepts by drawing on the collective
judgment of other actors, as in the concept similarity mechanism plotted in the fourth
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diagram. Actors first assess the similarity of any pair of concepts via common referrals by
other actors and then select the concept that makes the best match with the actor’s own
previously named concepts. Such a behavior permits the discourse to be constantly in
flux, with about 70% of all new statements deviating from the previously named concept
by the same actor (the green curve). The number of concepts between which the actors
then choose, however, is extraordinarily small (the orange curve), and ideological polar-
ization is significantly less present than in an Erdo˝s-Rényi random graph, that is, there
appears to be a substantial amount of cross-ideology mixing. At all time steps, there is
only one component with extremely low polarization.
The fifth diagram shows what happens if actors are consistency-maximizing such that
they give highest priority to their own previous concepts. As in the other mechanism
leading to path-dependency (the actor similarity mechanism), the number of components
becomesmaximal because every actor chooses not to deviate from their previous concept
anymore.
The sixth diagram shows the effects of the concept popularity mechanism. If actors
judge concepts only by their prevalence in the latest round of all actors’ histories, that is,
recent media coverage, all actors will eventually agree on a single concept, and all other
concepts will become extinct after about 500 time steps.
The seventh diagram demonstrates the effect of purely agenda-setting actors. They
tend to choose concepts which have been named very infrequently. This is basically the
opposite of the concept popularity effect described before. In this case, the degree of
innovation is high, and all concepts stay alive. Ideological polarization is not present,
and there is only one component at all time steps. The aggregate discourse is largely
chaotic.
The eighth diagram shows what happens if all actors maximize coherence between their
concept choice and the majority of governmental actors. As with the concept popularity
mechanism, all actors end up agreeing on one single concept after few time steps.
All of these situations are clearly unrealistic. They yield equilibria after at most 1,000
time steps. Moreover, in all cases, at least one of the indicators deviates significantly
from what one would expect given theoretical characterizations of political discourses.
In real-world discourses, there should be a fairly high ideological polarization between
approximately two camps. These camps should be loosely connected, and they should
exhibit a higher density internally. The population of concepts should not become too
small because real-world discourses usually include many different aspects as well. None
of the configurations presented so far meets these requirements even approximately.
Figure 2 therefore shows some more complex configurations of the utility functions. The
phase transition takes considerably more time steps to complete than in the case of sin-
gle mechanisms. The simulations are run for 10,000 time steps in order to assess the
equilibrium behavior of the models.
Analysis of simple interaction effects
An interesting finding from the previous configurations of the utility functions is that
actor similarity (β3 and γ3) and concept similarity (β4 and γ4) have complementary
strengths. Each of the two models separately is unrealistic but has certain strengths. The
actor similarity model shows a high degree of ideological polarization, and the diversity
of concepts remains high. The concept similarity model, on the other hand, shows a high
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number of concept changes and a low number of components. It might therefore be a
good idea to mix the two mechanisms in order to generate a more realistic aggregate
picture of a political discourse.
In the first case, therefore, all actors apply the actor similarity (coalition formation)
mechanism and the concept similarity (wisdom of the crowds) mechanism with equal
strength. That is, the β and γ weights of the third and fourth components of the util-
ity function are set to 1. The aggregate pattern is already more realistic than any single,
separate mechanism (Figure 2, first diagram): ideological polarization is slightly higher
than in a random graph, the number of concepts remains fairly high, and the innova-
tive capacity of the discourse is moderate. These are fairly realistic patterns if compared
to theoretical expectations of real-world discourses. However, the discourse falls into
two separate components or camps, which stay separated for the remaining time steps.
This is clearly unrealistic, given the large amount of overlap between the advocacy coali-
tions observed in empirical case studies [2,40]. Moreover, ideological polarization is only
slightly higher than pure chance would predict, so some kind of exogenous ideology seems
to be necessary in the model.
The second model assumes that all actors maximize ideological fit as well as coherence
with the line of the government, and exhibit agenda-setting behavior. Agenda setting is
weighted twice as high as each of the other two components of the utility function. In
other words, the innovative potential of each actor is exactly as high as governmental
coherence and exogenous ideology together. The scenario deviates from the expectations
insofar as a very high number of distinct ideological camps emerges.
Beside government coherence, there is no mechanism in the model that would provide
incentives for actors to adopt concepts from other coalitions (‘learning across coalitions’).
The third diagram therefore incorporates such an element into the utility function. The
configuration is extended by adding the concept similarity mechanism to the equation.
The result is as expected: the number of distinct components is significantly lower than
before, and the number of concept changes is much higher. On the other hand, there are
approximately two components at the end of the 10,000 time steps (showing a relatively
high variance), with a gradual upward trend. It would be better if the model generated one
single component that sometimes fell into two separate components and then merged
them again, rather than a situation where there are usually two separate components
which are sometimes merged and then dissolve again, given the literature on policy bro-
kers that tie together competing factions in policy domains [40]. Moreover, all models
presented so far have not distinguished interest groups from governmental actors.
The fourth model therefore makes some simple and presumably fairly straightforward
assumptions about the political process by giving governmental actors and interest groups
two different utility functions. In this model, interest groups maximize ideological fit and
governmental coherence. This is presumably close to empirically observable discourses
for two reasons: first, because interest groups have different interests - modeled here as
two extremes on a one-dimensional scale; second, because interest groups always try to
convince decision-makers of their favored policy image [28], which implies that they reit-
erate the ideas of governmental actors if they match their ideology. Repeating favorable
ideas of governmental actors serves the purpose of supporting decision-makers when
they happen to call for the ‘right’ policy instruments in their perspective. For these rea-
sons, combining ideology and governmental coherence in the utility function of interest
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groups is a plausible and simple assumption. Governmental actors, on the other hand,
pursue a threefold strategy. Of course, they opt for governmental coherence (γ8). As
Heclo asserts, politicians also ‘puzzle’ about what solution concepts are desirable because
their environment is complex and they are no experts [6]. For this reason, they show a
tendency to adopt popular claims in the debate (γ6). Finally, politicians have an interest
in determining the politics of the day and presenting innovative solution concepts that
are currently not on the political agenda [30]. They adopt rare concepts with the same
strength as they go for government coherence and concept popularity together (γ7). Such
a configuration of the utility function yields exactly one component at all time steps, with
moderate polarization and a slowly decreasing number of concepts. This configuration
of the discourse is already close to the theoretical expectations and empirical observa-
tions generated by the literature on advocacy coalitions [9,10], but the separation of the
coalitions should be clearer than implied by the model presented here. Especially govern-
mental actors are modeled as largely chaotic beings who do not have any preconceptions
about what is right or wrong in the first place. This erratic trend-hunting behavior
is apparently the main reason why the separation between the ideological camps is
so low.
The fifth model therefore changes the utility function of governmental actors and adds
exogenous ideology to the calculus of politicians (γ1). To keep up a good balance between
continuity and change, it is always necessary to balance path-dependent mechanisms
like ideology or self-consistency maximization, and innovative mechanisms like agenda-
setting behavior, so a weight of 3 is attached to agenda setting (γ7). In this configuration,
ideological polarization is indeed stronger and more stable over time. However, the num-
ber of concepts is still slowly decreasing over time, and betweenness centralization is
rather low. The reason may be that interest groups do not have any innovative potential at
all in this model. They merely follow the majority of governmental actors and their own
convictions.
The final model therefore takes into account that interest groups may have higher pay-
offs from selecting concepts with lower prevalence in the discourse. The agenda-setting
behavior of interest groups makes up one third of their utility (β7). The result is strik-
ingly realistic when being compared to the theoretical expectations raised above as well
as recent empirical evidence on real-world policy discourses [1,2,35]: there is usually one
component, which shows substantial ideological polarization. At the same time, ideo-
logical polarization is not maximal; there are still many ties in the network that allow
for cross-coalition mixing, effectively binding the two ideological camps together in one
single component. Every now and then, the discourse becomes so polarized that the
overlap between the coalitions disappears. During these stages, there is no common
ground for discussion anymore. Soon after, however, the camps engage in mutual delib-
eration again and establish some common ground for potential consensus. This is shown
by the black line, which is usually showing only one component, but which sometimes
slightly deviates upwards. The upward deviations are apparently so small because the line
shows the average share of components of all 100 simulation runs, but the deviations
are still visible. Betweenness centralization is moderate at all time steps, with substan-
tial variation in terms of the confidence intervals. On the one hand, this shows that
two clusters can be indeed clearly identified within the single component. On the other
hand, the variation shows that the discourse is still far from being in equilibrium in the
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sense that every actor would reiterate the same concepts over and over again, as in the
first eight simple configurations shown in the previous figures. This claim is supported
by the green curve, which demonstrates that the number of recent concept changes is
significantly above zero. The population of concepts is diverse and ‘healthy’ at all time
steps. It may happen that one or two concepts disappear from the discourse, but the rela-
tively strong agenda-setting component always reinvigorates them after a couple of time
steps. Finally, even though the discourse is out of equilibrium in the sense that actors
still come up with new concepts and the discussion is vivid and ongoing, the observ-
able network statistics time series become stationary after the initial rewiring process.
This means that the structure of the discourse is very likely to remain approximately
stable as shown in the sixth diagram for an unlimited time. The discourse is constantly
in flux, but the basic bipolar structure is stationary, with some random fluctuations
over time. This final model therefore seems to capture the essence of political discourse
relatively well.
Figure 3 validates the claims about the structure of the discourse in the final model
by visualizing an exemplary simulation run. Different node shapes (circles and squares)
reflect the two different ideologies. Governmental actors are represented by green nodes
and interest groups by blue vertices. In the first panel, the actor co-occurrence network is
in the early stages of the rewiring process from a random graph to a discourse network.
There is no typical discourse structure yet. After 1,000 time steps, the rewiring pro-
cess has been completed. There are two coalitions corresponding to the two ideologies,
with several connections between the two factions. Governmental actors are particularly
likely to cluster together and connect the two camps. This is also visible after 5,000 time
steps. At time step 5,806, the two coalitions almost lose their last bit of overlap. Only
one governmental actor serves as a bridge between the two coalitions. The polarization
slightly decreases again soon after. After 7,500 time steps, one can see that discourse does
not necessarily have to be one-dimensional. As can be observed in empirical discourse
networks [2], coalitions can sometimes decompose into two or more subcoalitions with
different aims and beliefs. The rectangles at time step 7,500 make up two or three sub-
clusters within the rectangular advocacy coalition. Moreover, the circles are connected to
the rectangles via two different brokers. It is also noteworthy that actors from one coali-
tion may sometimes join the opponent and then come back - a feature of the discourse
that is also occasionally observable in empirical discourse networks [2]. Finally, the sit-
uation goes back to a somewhat polarized normal state with two relatively homogenous
coalitions again after 10,000 time steps.
Conclusions
This article has presented a family of agent-based computational discourse network
models. The most striking finding is that simple interactions of some of the proposed
mechanisms yield discursive structures that are in line with what is expected theoretically
and empirically [9-11,40], while none of the basic mechanisms separately has implications
that seem to correspond to the real world. In particular, ideology, concept popularity,
agenda setting, and government coherence each produce unrealistic discourse networks.
If combined in a single utility function of agents, and if one distinguishes between the
roles of interest groups and governmental actors, however, these mechanisms lead to
plausible discursive structures.
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Figure 3 Exemplary simulation run of the final model. Actor co-occurrence network of the collective
histories of all actors. The two different ideologies are represented by different node shapes. Governmental
actors are green, and interest groups are blue.
Apparently, neither purely exogenous preferences nor purely endogenous opinion for-
mation can explain the structure of real-world policy debates. Only a combination of the
two paradigms is fruitful in modeling political discourse. This finding may help to build a
bridge between rational choice and constructivism, which have been subject to extensive
controversies.
Moreover, only a simultaneous presence of both innovative and path-dependent mech-
anisms ensures that a simulated discourse lives up to the implications of its real-world
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counterparts. This finding suggests that even discourses which underlie ‘normal’ states
of policy making are guided by a balance of stochastic elements and the prosecution of
self-interest.
The parameter settings tested here have been arrived at in an explorative fash-
ion. There may be other combinations of mechanisms that produce similar or even
more realistic results. Future research could explore this possibility by employing a
combinatorial optimization algorithm such as simulated annealing to find optimal com-
binations of parameter settings in order to find the simplest relatively accurate model.
Employing a combinatorial search heuristic would require that all relevant metrics
like ideological polarization etc. can be combined in a single goodness-of-fit statis-
tic which can then be optimized by the algorithm, which is currently not the case.
Beside these potential improvements in the analysis stage, there are several assump-
tions which could be modified in future work to get a more nuanced picture of spe-
cific aspects of political discoursee. Future research should also aim to test specific
mechanisms or interactions outlined here in experimental settings or using empirical
data to further our understanding of the social processes underlying political dis-
course. One promising avenue for this are the recent advances in relational event
modeling [41].
Endnotes
a The replication source code of the model is provided as Additional File 1.
bIf the ideological scores are not fixed at the extreme poles, one of the following
consequences hold: the simulation runs exhibit the same results but take considerably
longer to show a recurring pattern, or multiple ‘coalitions’ emerge instead of just two
coalitions (hence the discourse becomes multipolar instead of bipolar). The parameter
choice is made because the majority of real-world discourses appear to be bipolar rather
than multipolar.
chttp://www.jgrapht.org (as of October 9, 2013).
dhttp://repast.sourceforge.net/ (as of October 9, 2013).
eIn particular, the following assumptions could be modified to make the model more
realistic (but less parsimonious): other actors like scientists, opposition, voters, or the
media do not play a role; actors may have different resource endowments and therefore
different skill levels regarding the accuracy of their information; the number of actors
stays constant over the whole discourse; a discourse does not interfere with other
topical discourses; the number of concepts is constant; actors are not allowed to hold
contradictory positions regarding the same normative concept; new concepts are
never introduced to the discourse; external perturbations [9] do not exist; exactly one
statement is made at every new time step; actors observe all other actors’ statements,
that is, there is complete and perfect information; actors’ ideological positions are
extreme (instead of being, for example, normally distributed with two modes); the
eight mechanisms in the utility function are exhaustive; and the probability that a
governmental actor makes a statement is 60%.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Compressed ZIP archive. This file contains the Java source code of the simulation model and R
code for the replication of the statistical analysis.
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